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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND DEFENDANT
THE RELIANCE INSURANCE

COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 10087

vs.
GLE~~.ARD

1\I. HO'LLINS,
Defendant and Respondent.

FACITS
I
Glenn Hollins, Inc., hereinafter referred to as
Hollins, Inc. was a corpof1ation engaged in used car
sales in Ogden, Utah in 19'54. Glennard M. Hollins
\Y3s the president and a director of Hollins, Inc.

Hollins, Inc. was licensed as a used car ·dealer
and to secure said license had complied with 41-3-16
DEALERS BOND: which requires a $5,000.00 bond
\Yith a corporate surety to protect customers from
any violation of the provision of the motor vehicle
act by the dealer.
The Reliance Insurance Company, hereinafter
referred to as Reliance, issued the dealer's bond to
Hollins, Inc. to license it to do busin·ess (Judgment
R17.P4).
1
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General Credit Company, a corporation, was a
credit comp~any financing the used car operation
of Hollins, Inc.
Hollins, Inc. sold a Buick to Miller and an Oldsmobile to Pettingell in 1954. General Credit held
titles to said cars and Hollins, Inc. claimed to have
paid General Credit all sums received from the purchasers on said transactions ( R 12).
General Credit refused to deliver titles to said
cars to Miller and Pettingell.
II
FIRST CASE: ALL ISSUES ADJUIDTCATED
FAVORABLE 'TO RELIAN·CE AND NO APP'EAL
TAKEN.
In Civil No. 106828, hereinafter referred to as
the first case, General Credit sued Reliance on said
bond covering Hollings, Inc., a corporation, in which
it alleged:
1. Reliance had issued a motor vehicle DEALER'·S .BOND to Hollins, Inc., pursuant to 41-3-16

(R 1, P 3).
2. Hollins, Inc. had sold 1an Oldsmobile and
a Buick and had failed to deliver certificates of title
therefore, in violation of 41-1-65 and 41~3-23(D),
and ~by reason thereof Reliance was liable to General
Credit on the bond of Hollins, Inc. as provided for
in 41-·3-18 (R 1-3).
In its answer Reliance (a) admitted it issued
2
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said bond to Hollins, Inc., the dealer corporation,
under 41-3-16 (R 4, P 2), (b) Reliance filed the
affidavit of Glennard M. Hollins as a corporate officer of Hollins, Inc. ( R 12), and (c) had its attoriH'Y also represent Glennard M. Hollins during
the taking of his deposition un·der subpoena ( R 11) .
In General Credit vs. Reliance, or the first case,
the Court entered its decision and found:
Hollins, Inc. was a corporation duly licensed to do business and said bond had issued to enable
said corporation to secure a license pursuant to
41-3-16 ( R 17, P 4) .
1.

2. Hollins, Inc., the corporation, sold the 13uic~
and Oldsmobile involved (R 17).
3. Hollins, Inc., the corpor1ation, did not violate 41-1-65 or 41-3-23(D) for failure to deliver
-.A.
title (R 18).
Complaint of General Credit was dismissed
(R 16-17).
-!.

III
SE'COND CASE: RELIAN·CE vs. HOLLINS,
C.-\SE No. 121386 RELIAN·CE SEE~S l~E~
COVERY FOR ITS INVOLVEMEN·T IN FIRST
CASE, BUT REQUE'S'TS THE SAME COURT 'TIO
FIND DIRE·CTLY CONTRARY ON ALL ISSUES
.-\S DETERMINED IN THE FIR'ST CASE. FRO'M
DISMISSAL OF SECOND CASE RELIANCE APPEALS.
3
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Alleging that Hollins as an individual made
said sales and agreed to indemnify Reliance for the
loss under said first case 106828 afores,aid, the defendant Reliance in first case became plaintiff in an
action 121386, referred to as the second case, wherein Reliance sued Glennard M. Hollins as an individual; and in said action Reliance alleged:

1.

Glennard M. Hollins as an INDIVIDUAL,
hereinafter referred to as Hollins, sold the same two
automobiles theretofore determined as having been
sold by the corporation in the first case 106828 (R
19 an·d 20).
2. The sales made by Hollins as an individual
were in violation of statutes by reason of his failure
to deliver titles therefor (R 20, P 7).
3. Reliance was compelled to pay $36 7.00 by
reason of said Hollins' failure to deliver titles and
by reason thereof said Reliance was subjected to the
law suit 10!6828, or the first ca~se (R ·20, P 5 and 6).
The application and bond were attached to the complaint.
The pretrial order provided that the plaintiff's
pleadings stated the issues of pl1aintiff's case (R 31).
1

At the trial Reliance vs. Hollins or ~civil121386,
the secon·d case, and th:e one here under consideration, the entire file of the first case, General Credit
vs. Reliance l1tsurance Company, 106828, was received into the ·evidence ( R 32).
4
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Counsel for Reliance admitted to the Court
that RPliance had no evidence that it paid $3'67.00
or any other sum by reason of failure of Hollins or
Hollin~, Inc. to deliver titles.
Counsel for defendant Hollins moved the Court
for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Counsel for
Reliance at no time asked leave to am·end its pleadings and submitted the matter on issues 1as plead
by it for the Court's decision.
The Court entered fin·dings and judgment in
the second case, 121386, and found the same as it
had thereto found in the first case, its findings in
the second case being found at R 3'3 as follows:
1. A Dealer's Bond issued to enable Hollins,
Inc. to secure its license.
2. Hollins did not sell the cars to the parties
named in pl aintiff's complaint and Hollins wa:s not
in ,·iolation of 41-1-65 or applicable 'Statutes for
failure to deliver titles involving said sales.
1

3.

Neither Reliance nor Hollins as an individual were subjected to a law suit by reason of
the sale of said automobiles, because Hollins did
not deliver ti ties therefor ( R 33, P 9) .

4.

Reliance's case was dismissed.

Reliance appeals therefrom.
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IV.

ARGUMENT:
FIRST CASE

SECOND CASE, CASE
AT BAR- 'Supreme Court
No. 10087 - Reliance vs.
Glennard M. Hollins Civil No. 121386. Allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint- seeR 19

General Credit vs. Reliance

Civil No. 106g28
Court Findings - see R 17

1. Hollins

as individual
was princi pa1 on bond.

1. ·Bond issued for
corporation.

2. · Ho111ns as· individual
sold cars.

2. Hollins, Inc. sold cars.

3.
:3. H'ollins, Inc. no violation.

Hollins as individual
was violator.

4. Hollins as violator subjected Reliance to suit.

4. Action against Hollins,
Inc.~ dismissed.

5. ,Reliance paid money for
Hollins' violation for
f·ailure to deliver tiUe.

,5. Reliance required to pay
no money.

(Reliance seeks to ,recover
on false facts, all f'aots being contrary to decision in
its favor in former acfion)

(Issues here determined. at
request of Reliance as defendant are res judicata)

6
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The Court's attention is invited to the following facts:
1. The District Court in 106828, the first
ca~r, found the $5,000.00 bond issued under 41-3-16
\Va~ not an individual's bond but a Dealer's bond.
The Court found that Hollins, Inc. was the principal and Reliance was the surety on the bond. Moreover, the application (R 24 line 10) shows it was
for a bond in which the corporation wa:s principal,
and not for Hollins individually as principal or as
surety. In said application where is printed, ''Names
of officers if applicant is corporation", officers are
named (R 25).

-11-3-17 provides for a bond for :an in·dividual
in the amount of $1,000.00, which would.:have to
have been applied for and issued to Hollins indiYidually to qualify him and before he could personall? be subjected to liability either as principal or
surety.
\\"hile the first case 106828 is not before this
Court for consideration, it is obvious the District
Court in making the a:bovestated findings · found
that although no words of official capacity appear
below the signature of Glennard M. Hollins, the
Court \\·as convinced from the evidence adduced
and the deposition that the application was in fact
signed by hi1n as an officer of the corporation and
not as an individual. This is true, since there is no
other signature of any other officer appearing on
said application.
7
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It is preposterous for the appellant Reliance
to represent to this Court FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL that it should have had judgment in
the second cas-e, 121386, against Hollins as a surety
notw1thstanding there was no pleading to justify
recovery on st1ch basis ~and with said application
having been adjudicated as 'having been made by
an officer of the corporation (R 17), in the first
case General Credit vs. Reliance, the court adjudicated Hollins, Inc. as the principal :and Reli~ance the
surety. In the second case Reliance seeks to recover
against Hollins as an individual on the agreement
CR 25) which a·greement is obviously an agreement
'by the principal Hol'Iins, Inc. to reimburse the surety
Reliance for 1a loss - sustained by Reliance and
caused by fault of the principal Hollins, Inc. Even
if the District Court in 106828 had not so found,
Reliance could not possibly even by 'torturing said
agreemen~t impose liability upon Hollins under the
terms thereof as principal or surety.
Moreover, even if the case of General Credit vs.
Reliance h·ad been appealed, the appellate court
would 'have held that an instrument prepared by an
insurance company would be strictly construed
against it and the application shows 'Hollins did
n·ot sign either as 'a surety or as a principal; and
under th eterms of the application itself no such
intention was expressed or could be claimed; moreover, since Hollins did not make the sales, there
could be no liability on him in any event since the
8
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claims of Reliance in the second action, is predicated
on salPs of cars made by Hollins as an individual
( R 19 P 5 and 6).
During all proceedings under the first case,
(;cneral Credit vs. Hollins, the same counsel represPnted all three parties in opposing General Credit
and there was a confidential relation of attorney
and client between Reliance, Hollins, Inc. and Hollins as an individual, when the same counsel prepared and filed an affidavit signed by Glennard M.
Hollins certifying th,at h·e was president and a director of the corporation Hollins, Inc., and th·at Hollins.,
Inc. paid General Credit all money received from
the sales of said cars ( R 12), and when the same
counsel represented Hollins whe nhis deposition was
taken under subpoena ( R 11) . Neither Hollins, Inc.
nor Hollins had representation other th1an the same
counsel who also represented Reliance.
Reliance is charged with the knowledge that
Hollins signed the application ( R 25) as is asserted
in (R 26) 121386 only as an officer and not indi,·idually and Reliance admitted this in its answer
in 106828, R 4, P 2) and the Court so found (R 17,
p -1).
The entire gist of the action in the first case
is based upon the liability of Reliance for failure
of Hollins, Inc. to deliver titles for cars sold by
Hollins, Inc. in violation of statute. General Credit
alleges that since Reliance bonded (Hollins, Inc. (not
Hollins as an individual) that Reliance was liable
9
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under said bond of Hollins, Inc. by virtue of liability
imposed by statute 41-3-18 (R 3, P 7).
In order to have jurisdiction of the subject
matter in Gener~al Credit vs. Reliance, the Court
had to conclude 1. That the bond was applied for
and issued to the corporation; 2. The corporation
made the sale; ~and 3. That the corporation was
nevertheless .not in violation of law for failure to
deliver title. Moreover, Reliance requested in its
pleadings said judgment as entered, and Reliance
relied upon said judgment to terminate its liability
under said bond, and is estopped to assert otherwise.
Reliance through the judgment and confidential relation existing and under pleading on issues
plead and rai'sed by Reliance inter se is charged and
bound with the fact that the Court determined there
was no viol1a.tion of law in failure of even the corporation to deliver titles to the purchasers of the cars
involved. Reliance is also. charged with the knowledge that it paid no sums whatever to J. C. Miller,
to Irene Pettingell or to any other person for failure
of either Hollins, Inc. or Hollins to deliver titles
in violation of statute, which claim is. the entire
gist of its action on the second case. Moreover, all
issues wer adju-dicated, qetermined and found and
delineated in flavor of Reliance in the first action
and at its request on pleadings inter se where it was
the very party who raised said iss,ue and put on
10
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evidence to support said findings and judgment and
n1oved the Court to enter the same as it was entered.
Every fact plead by Reli~ance in its secon·d case
is in direct conflict with the findings and judgement
of the District Court; and all facts alleged are false,
and so known to be false by said Reli·ance ·and by
its counsel, which counsel was enjoying ·a confidential rel~ation with both Hollins and Reliance in s·aid
first action.
WHEREFORE, respondent prays t h at the
judgment of the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow be
affirmed with costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK & S'CH'OE NHALS
1

E. L. 'Scho'enhals
903 Kearns Building :.
Salt Lake City, Utah .
. Attorneys for Respondent _

,• ·•

•

I

~~ • ' ·•

•

<,;

'

·I'
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
GLENNARD M. H'01LLI'NS,
· Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
THE RELIANCE INS'U'RAN·CE
COMPANY, a corporation,

Supreme Court
Case No. 10168

Defendant and Respondent.

S TATEMENT O·F KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover from a litigant who
plead defam,atory actionable statements against
Hollins when said statements had in prior litigation to which said pleader was a party been adjudicated :Daise.
1

DI'S·P:OSITION IN LOWER COURT
Complaint was dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
RELIEF 8'0UGHT
Reversal of judgmen of dismissal, and judgment for appellant on the pleadings determining
liability of Reliance.
I
FA~c·Ts

All of the facts recited in Reliance, Appellant
12
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vs. llollins, Respondent, Supreme Court Case 10087,
are hereby made a part of this brief.
Subsequent to the entry of judgment in the
second case. Reliance vs. Hollins, from which Reliance appealed, or Supreme Court No. 10087, Glennard 1\'I. Hollins, on March 11, 1964, filed an action
in the District Court of Salt Lake County entitled
Glcnnard ill. Hollins vs. Reliance Insurance Company, Civil No. 148788, which was th·e third case
in the trial courts in a series of cases involving the
partiPs. In this third case, Hollins asserted as the
gist of his action that having been wrongfully subjected to said litigation, in the second action wherein Reliance asserted false, libelous, defamatory actionable statements against him and charged him
\vith a crime; to-wit, vioLation of 41-3-2 ·and 41-3-3
that his credit relations and responsibility h·ad been
thereby destroyed and he had been damaged and
by reason thereof he had been deprived of earning
a liYing or securing employment.
In said action, Hollins seeks to recover from
Reliance based upon all facts asserted in the forepart of this brief. Hollins h~ad no independent legal
counsel and had made full and complete disclosures
and reposed confidence in said attorneys, who at
that time also had a confidential relation with Reliance. He alleged that in total disregard of said
confidential relation and the findings and judgment
as entered in favor of Reliance in the prior case,
and \veil knowing all facts it asserted were fal'Se,
13
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Reliance nevertheless did wilfully and m~aliciously
harass, embarass and su. bject him to said action.
To Hollins' complaint in said third action was attached as Exhibits the Judgment in the first action and
the ·Compl aint of Reliance, including as Exhibits the
Judgment in the first action an·d the Complaint of
Reliance, including as Exhibits the application or
the pleadings as filed by Reliance suing Hollins as
. d.IVl"du al In
. th e secon d action
. R ________
I- y-' I
an In
1

. Reliance filed its Motion to Dismiss, R ~9, asserting that the facts recited by Hollins in said
Complaint did not state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The matter came on for hearing
and argument and the Court entered its order dismissing s1aid Complaint in said third action with
prejudice. It i'S from said Order of Dismissal R ---Hollins 'here appeals.
II

ARGUMEN'T
Appellant adopts all argument in the preceding
case and makes the same a part of this argument.
III
POINT I
RELIAN~CE WAS STRIPPED OF IMMUNITY AND
PR·OTE~C·TION AOC,ORDED STATEMENTS IN J'UDI-

CIAL PROCEEDINGS WHERE FORMER JUDGMENT
TO W'HI~CH IT WAS A PARTY RENDERED SAID
STATEMENTS FALSE.

The Reliance Insurance Company disregarded
the prior judgment of the District Court rendered
14
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in its favor in the first action and asserted facts
exactly opposite to the former judgment as shown,
~ee IV, page 6 forepart of brief under Argument.
Reliance did nevertheless subject Hollins to a
lawsuit in which Reliance charged Hollin·s with a
criminal offense and false facts, despite the fact a
prior determination by the District Court rendered,
as requested by Reliance, had adjudicated and deternlined otherwise.
While there is some authority extendin·g ·privilege to parties stating false facts in judici'al proceedings, the better view as stated at 33 Am. Jur.
146 is:
"The privilege in these jurisdictions does not
extend to matters known to· be fialse." (See
note 5 for cases)
Counsel can find no case or authority protecting a litigant in judicial proceedings from liability
for defamation or other actionable statements, where
in a prior judicial proceedings to which said "litigant was a party, a deterination h·ad been m~a·de
which would render said statements false.
Moreover, as stated in the case of Httrshatv
t•s. Harslw.u.•, 16 S. E. 2d 66i,J36 A. L. R. 1411: .
"'The defendants were stripped of the protection accorded statements in judicial pleadings
by the former judgment to which they were
parties and to which they~ agreed, and may
not now be heard to cLaim privilege for the
publication of defamation which it thus had
been judicially established was false."
15
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Public respect for the Courts could be enhanced
when the Courts having "determined a matter then
relieve the public from further harassment over the
same issue and make actionable any subsequent
flagrant publication in complete disregard of issues by the Court theretofore resolved.
T'his should be particularly true when the issues were resolved favorable to and the Order prepared by the offender.
Moreover, the Court could well consider the
action of Reliance reprehensible where it not only
asserted false facts dis reg1arding a judgment in
its favor, but also asserted false facts known to be
false under the confidential relation that existed.
The allegations of the Complaint in the third
case 1are substantiated by Exhibits and the Judgment in the first case is made an Exhibit, R.ll,
and the complete Complaint and Exhibits filed by
Reliance in the second case R/-1 are attached to
the complaint fi1'ed by Hollins and which Complaint
the lower court dismissed. Said :Dacts are set forth
in the pleadings and m'ade a p:art of the public
record and may not be altered or changed. Under
the authorities cited above, together with rn'alice being presumed under such circumstances (see 53
C. J. S. 125), this ·Court could expedite the administration of justice 1and relieve Hollins from being
further involved in another appeal by not only reversing the lower Court but by also ordering judg16
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1nent on the pleadings for I-Iollins, as to liability of
Reliance.
'VHEREFORE, appellant Hollins prays that
the lower court be reversed, and the case be reinstated with instructions that Hollins have summary
judgment on the issue of liability of his claim against
Reliance.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK & 'BCHOENHALS
E. L. Schoenhals
903 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

......
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